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Abstrak 
 
Para pengajar pendidikan kewarganegaraan selalu 
mengalami dilemma antara pengajaran nilai-nilai 
kewarganegaraan dengan pendidikan moral. Jika terfokus 
kepada yang pertama, pengajaran hanya akan berupa 
observasi antropologis terhadap fakta-fakta empiris pada 
suatu bangsa. Sementara jika menekankan kepada 
pendidikan moral per se, meskipun normatif tetapi sarat 
dengan premis-premis metafisik yang kontroversial yang 
mungkin tidak semua siswa dapat menerimanya. Untuk 
memecahkannya banyak teori politik dan pendidikan telah 
dirumuskan diantaranya civic religion dari Gutmann, teori 
komunitarian Rober N. Bellah dan mungkin yang paling 
relevan adalah paham libertarian yang bicara soal keadilan 
dari John Rawls dan lain-lain. Semuanya akan 
diintegrasikan dalam kurikulum yang bertujuan untuk 
memberi kemampuan siswa untuk memahami konsensus, 
bagaimama memahami masyarakat dan memahami 
hubungan antara merefleksikan hubyungan tersebut serta 
membangun moral pribadi mereka. Rawls percaya bahwa 
pendidikan harus mengajak kepada keterlibatan dalam 
dialog publik mengenai nilai-nilai kewarganegaraan demi 
merumuskan sebuah moralitas pribadi. 
 
   I. INTRODUCTION 
Civic educators seem to be faced with an insoluble set of related 
problems. For example, they can teach students about the civic 
ideals of their particular nation as a set of empirical facts, what the 
people of this particular place at this particular time happen to 
believe about the political and social roles of government and the 
obligations of citizens to that government and to one another. 
Alternatively, to provide a moral foundation for civic education, 
they can teach students a particular comprehensive moral theory -- 
Locke’s  liberalism, Mill’s utilitarianism, or Kant’s deontology, for 
example -- from which principles of government, many of which 
coincide with the nation’s civic ideals, can be deduced.  
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The problem with the first approach is that the resulting civic 
ideals lack moral authority; they are only anthropological 
observations about the beliefs that we hold. The problem with the 
second is that, although the principles thus derived do make 
genuine normative claims upon students, they are based on 
controversial metaphysical premises that not all students can 
accept, especially in a nation of diverse cultures and religions. As a 
consequence, the second approach threatens to enmesh school in 
deep and unresolved arguments about whether and how American 
civic ideals align with the beliefs or particular religious, cultural, 
and even ethnic groups within the society. In the teeth of this 
prospect, many civic educators in the public schools opt for the first 
approach, even though it leaves students without attractive 
normative justifications for the civic ideals that they teach. 
 II. DISCUSSION 
To be sure, various political and educational theorists have long 
sought solutions to this particular problem. One of the most familiar 
is to regard a nation’s civic ideals as a kind of civic religion. (e.g., 
Aristotle, 1981, and Gutmann, 1999). The values included in those 
ideals could thus be taught by catechism, as beliefs to be accepted 
rather than as assertions to be understood. Once accepted, the ideals 
can be given an internal justification, that is, an explanation of how 
they are consistent with and mutually reinforce one another. Indeed, 
these theorists often maintain that little else in the way of 
justification for normative political beliefs is possible.  
In schools, this position coincides with a third approach 
among civic educators today. It provides for students civic ideal 
that have moral authority without seeming to raise the issue of their 
relationship to students = other moral commitments. But this 
approach has its problems as well. It asks students to develop a 
divided consciousness with regard to their moral commitments, 
with their civic morality widely separated from their various 
personal or cultural moralities. In maintaining such a divided 
consciousness, however, students have difficulty in attaining a real 
allegiance to the civic morality unless the nation also seeks to 
replace their personal moralities with the civic morality. For 
otherwise such a civic morality does not have the vividness and 
immediacy of the moralities supported by students’ day-to-day 
contact with their families, churches, and other intimate 
associations from which they derive their personal moralities. 
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Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin understood this well, but our commitments 
to diversity and liberty do not let us travel that path.  
Thus, this third strategy is for us a recipe for widespread civic 
apathy in which students = personal moral commitments far 
overshadow their civic commitments. As a result, the practices of 
civic educators today seem to have a common consequence. Those 
who practice the first approach provide students with knowledge 
about civic beliefs but do not provide those beliefs with a moral 
status. Those who practice the third approach provide civic beliefs 
that have a moral status, but they tend not to generate motivation 
for action based on students’ civic morality. Both these approaches 
leave us with citizens whose attitudes and action are effectively 
disengaged from our civic ideal, even though those citizens may 
profess a belief in them. And almost no one practices the second 
approach for the sensible reason that it is inconsistent with our civic 
ideals themselves because it requires public institutions to advocate 
particular metaphysical assumptions in conflict with many of their 
citizens’ fundamental commitments. This conflict would in turn 
leave students with an uncertain commitment to the moral 
foundation of our civic ideals and thus to the civic ideals 
themselves. 
John Rawls’s political philosophy may provide civic 
educators with an alternative response to these disturbing 
conclusions. At least that is the possibility that I will explore in this 
essay. In A Theory of justice, originally published in 1971, Rawls 
(1999) lays out a complicated argument for a particular conception 
of justice, that is, his renowned two principles of justice, the 
substance of which will not figure prominently in this essay. 
However, as part of that argument, Rawls outlines a strategy, called 
the method of reflective equilibrium, for developing principles to 
govern a society, of which the particular argument in that book is 
an example. This strategy, rather than the specific application of it 
in A Theory of justice, is the point of departure for this analysis. 
Indeed, his subsequent book, Political Liberalism, Rawls (1996) 
generalizes about and elaborates on this strategy of moral 
reasoning. 
For Rawls, a politically liberal society is one in which 
citizens are free within reasonable limits to adopt for themselves the 
particular conceptions of the good that seem most appropriate to 
them as individuals and as members of cultures, communities, and 
other associations. In other words, they can determine the purpose 
and ways of living that seem to them to be most meaningful. For 
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this reason, the members of a liberal society are likely to be in 
considerable disagreement over their most fundamental moral and 
intellectual commitments and in particular about the metaphysical 
premises that justify those commitments. 
The civic ideals for this kind of society pose a special 
problem since one cannot rely on an existing consensus about the 
moral foundation of those ideals. After all, citizens of a liberal 
society may, by definition, have widely disparate commitments 
about that foundation depending upon the particular conceptions of 
the good they find satisfactory. The difficulties and contradictions 
described at the beginning of this essay illustrate some of the 
apparent problems in rendering civic ideals consistent with this 
assumption about a liberal society: seemingly civic ideals will have 
to be merely facts about what citizens of a liberal society happen to 
agree about at a particular time ; otherwise, those ideals will be 
moral claims that compete with or displace citizens’ existing moral 
commitments. Nevertheless, Rawls suggests, it may still be possible 
to create a political agreement about the principles that are to 
govern their larger association by seeking what he calls an 
“overlapping consensus”. 
Superficially, an overlapping consensus may appear to be 
simply the beliefs about government that citizens happen to hold in 
common. However, what keeps Rawls’s overlapping consensus 
from being a simple catalogue of what citizens happen to agree 
about politically is the way in which it is established. In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls appeals initially to citizens’ intuitions of fairness and 
their settled convictions of justice. The former is what people in a 
particular society believe to be necessary conditions for a decision 
or a choice to be fair, such as, that those who make the decision 
should not have a personal stake in the result, or if they do that they 
should be capable of setting their personal interests aside in making 
the decision. The latter is the specific shared judgments that people 
reach about the justice or injustice of particular social practices, 
such as the currently widespread conviction of most Americans that 
slavery is wrong. Both intuitions of fairness and settled convictions 
of justice are examples of what people happen to believe.  
However, Rawls is not satisfied to derive principles of justice 
on the basis of those beliefs alone for the good reason that such 
beliefs almost certainly conflict with one another. Thus, for 
example, Americans’ widely held commitment to equality of 
opportunity implies that a government should interfere in families’ 
otherwise unobjectionable childrearing practices if they produce 
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significantly different life outcomes for different children, 
especially different outcomes that  cannot be corrected by extra-
familial public institution. However, such interference blatantly 
conflict with the equally widely held belief that parents have a right 
to communicate their moral and social beliefs to their children as 
long as they do not abuse them in the process. According to Rawls, 
the very purpose of political thought is, by means of the process of 
reflective equilibrium, to resolve these conflicts by ascertaining and 
prioritizing principles that can generate such intuitions and 
convictions. 
In doing so, the principles do not necessarily simply leave the 
initial conflicting intuitions and convictions entirely or even 
substantially intact. The resulting principles and the priorities 
among them almost certainly will adjust some beliefs to preserve 
citizens’ most central commitments while avoiding some other 
logical implications of those convictions with which citizens find it  
most difficult to live. Responding to the example above, Rawls 
formulates a principle of liberty that does not imply parents’ right 
to abuse their children, and he assigns to this restricted principle of 
liberty a priority above that of equal opportunity. Such principles, 
and not the raw intuitions themselves, represent for Rawls a 
genuine overlapping consensus in that they attempt to develop a 
special sort of consistency among our beliefs, that is, an equilibrium 
among our intuitions achieved by our careful reflection upon the 
applications of those intuitions that we hold to be inviolable and the 
applications that are less important to us. Indeed, noticing that some 
applications of our beliefs violate other important convictions is a 
good reason for us to modify or restrict our initial beliefs. 
It is possible to infer a number of erroneous conclusions 
about this process of reflective equilibrium. First, it might seem that 
this process aims at a permanent and immutable state of belief. 
However, it is likely that any equilibrium that is achieved will be 
the occasion of new experiences and reflections that invite further 
modifications of our beliefs. After all, an equilibrated set of beliefs 
become a new set of intuitions that initially direct action in ways 
that generate new social arrangement and, therefore, unfamiliar 
experiences that in turn help us discover contradictions in our 
beliefs that were previously obscure. Such experiences and our 
subsequent reflection upon them motivate further elaborations and 
modifications of beliefs toward new equilibrium. Second, it might 
seem that this process is essentially solitary, involving each citizen 
DEMOKRASI  Vol. IV No. 2 Th. 2005 
 
14 
in an inward-directed examination of the consistency and 
acceptability of his or her beliefs and their logical implications.  
There are, however, two reasons why this process is 
significantly public. One is that the new arrangements to which our 
equilibrated beliefs direct us have important public effects in that 
they naturally evoke responses from others, responses that help us 
understand their meaning and consequence. In adopting a restricted 
interpretation of principle of liberty, for instance, I will come to 
regard some previously accepted arrangements as objectionable and 
others that were optional as now required. Further, this change in 
my expectations and actions is widely shared by others because it 
reflects an overlapping consensus. Therefore, the equilibrium 
produces a new social and ideological milieu in which even the 
thoughts and actions not directly implicated by the modified beliefs 
may have unanticipated consequences and interpretations. As 
noted, some of these results can become the motivation for 
continuing the process of modification and equilibration of belief. 
Third, and as a consequence, the process of reflective equilibrium 
might seem detached from individuals’ most central moral 
commitments, operating entirely in an arena of political negotiation 
and compromise. However, this putative conclusion radically 
misrepresents the nature of the process. For the initial intuitions 
upon which the process is based are inevitably aligned with 
individuals’ personal metaphysical commitments, that is, their own 
conceptions of the good.  
Thus, while those intuitions are shared, they are also deeply 
connected with the various non public beliefs that a liberal society 
enables to flourish and that citizens have considerable freedom to 
adopt and modify. A change in those intuitions requires one to 
consider not only one’s reactions to others’ responses, actions, and 
experiences but also the consistency of those beliefs with one’s own 
prior metaphysical commitments. This consideration, in turn, can 
be the occasion for a revision of one=s conception of the good. My 
adopting a restricted principle of liberty can cause me to reconsider 
whether and how, for instance, my religious commitments are 
compatible with that modification in belief, which can further lead 
me, for example, to modify in appropriate ways the theology at the 
core of my conception of the good. Thus, the process of reflective 
equilibrium is continuous and can be simultaneously both 
inherently public and intensely personal. 
What emerges, then, from Rawls’s conception of the 
overlapping consensus is a distinctive view of liberal politics. On 
Can Civic and Moral Education Be Distinguished?... 15 
this view politics involves significant intellectual and social activity 
that implicates and influences what citizens believe both about their 
relationship with other citizens and about themselves. As we have 
seen, what people believe about themselves and their relationships 
is modified by a simultaneous process of public and private 
reasoning. In this process, the political principles that emerge have 
a moral status because of their connection with what come to be 
publicly shared and mutually reasonable beliefs and because of 
their integration with individual’s various conceptions of the good.  
These principles are in essence civic ideals that are not 
simply facts about people’s beliefs, not are they merely a 
codification of a national civic creed that competes with or 
displaces citizens’ metaphysical commitments. Because of they 
way that they are continuously developed and renewed, those ideals 
influence and are influenced by private commitments, but because 
they do not embrace any particular metaphysical foundation, they 
do pose a direct challenge to such beliefs. In a real sense, citizens 
take up the task of seeking and construction such foundations for 
themselves and in their own cultural and community associations, 
but any foundation that they develop do not become part of a 
society-wide public belief system. Of course, an emerging and 
evolving overlapping consensus certainly influences such private 
belief systems, but there is no reason to suppose that those systems 
converge into a single set of metaphysical commitments held by all 
citizens. Given citizens= initially divergent private beliefs and the 
commitment of a liberal society to freedom of conscience, in fact, 
such convergence is unlikely. Thus, an overlapping consensus is 
compatible both in principle and in fact with a wide diversity of 
private metaphysical structures of belief and justification. In this 
way, an overlapping consensus constitutes a set of evolving moral 
commitments about a nation’s civic ideals that is nevertheless 
harmonious with a wide variation in citizens’ private moralities.  
The public education system of such a liberal society can be 
understood as, in part, a set of government institution and practices 
that enable and promote the constitutional emergence of an 
overlapping consensus. From this perspective, civic education in 
public school is the element of the public education system that 
undertakes and accomplishes this task for the young. This education 
is not adequately conceived as simply a vehicle for informing the 
young about adults’ civic beliefs, for such information is at most 
only one element of what children need to learn in order to 
participate in the development of an overlapping consensus. Nor is 
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such civic education adequately conceived as the enforcement on 
the young of an authoritative and determinate civic doctrine, for no 
such doctrine is characteristic of an overlapping consensus because 
its principles are subject to constant reconsideration and 
modification.  
Finally, an adequate civic education is certainly not 
instruction in a particular metaphysical system of belief, even one 
with specific civic content or purpose, for such instruction confuses 
public with private education. Of course, a fully adequate system of 
civic education almost certainly includes elements that address 
adults of various ages and in various public roles, but the primary 
function of the remainder of this essay will be to elaborate to the 
extent possible the school-based curriculum and instructional 
procedures appropriate to this conception of civic education.  
Before considering the implications of this view for school 
curriculum and instruction, we are now able to confront the 
question posed in the title of this essay, that is, can civic and moral 
education be distinguished from one another? Civic education is 
certainly a kind of moral education in that it promotes and supports 
a public morality, that is, the agreements about the principles 
governing citizens= relationships with and obligations to one 
another that emerge from the process of reflective equilibrium 
outlined above. However, two observations about this answer are in 
order. First, civic education takes place in a liberal society. 
Obviously, there is also moral education guided by private 
metaphysical commitments and conducted by families, churches, 
communities, and other associations. And, as we will see below, 
there is also another kind of moral education to which public 
schools can contribute, namely, an education for personal liberty.  
Second, the morality involved in civic education is concerned as 
much with citizens’ commitment to the process of public and 
private reasoning from which an overlapping consensus emerges as 
it is with the substance of the principles that issue from it.  
Thus, a civic education that aims simply at children=s 
knowledge and acceptance of the current version of citizens’ 
agreements about principles is clearly insufficient in that would not 
enable them to maintain awareness of and allegiance to the 
principles as they are modified by citizens’ subsequent experience 
and reflection. Such an education would, indeed, be tantamount to 
an education in a particular civic doctrine. It could, moreover, mark 
the beginning of the collapse of an overlapping consensus in that 
the children so instructed would become citizens who are unable or 
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unwilling to modify the consensus in reasonable ways that reflect 
their experience with the consequences of those principles. Such 
citizens would find that the principles were no longer capable of 
making adequate sense of some of their experience and would be 
driven to find that meaning based exclusively on their private 
moralities. In this way, the public consensus could gradually 
fragment into competing private commitments to and justifications 
for citizens’ obligations to one another. Thus, a good deal is at stake 
in public schools’ efforts at civic education, namely, the future 
public coherence of the society as a whole.  
The aims of the curriculum for such a civic education are 
relatively straightforward. But in formulating those aims, we must 
place them in the context of the schools’ full contribution to 
children’s moral education. I have argued elsewhere (Bull,2002) 
that it is incumbent upon a liberal society to provide an education 
that makes it possible for each child to become his or her own 
person, an education for personal liberty. Without going into 
details, such an education includes meaningful exposure to 
conception of the good beyond that of the family and immediate 
community, the child’s coming to know about his or her own 
talents and proclivities, and instruction that enables the child to 
make reasonable judgments about available conceptions of the good 
in light of that knowledge (Bull, Fruehling, and Chattergy, 1992 ). 
In this way, public schools make a contribution to the developing 
private morality of children without determining the substance of 
that morality. Civic education must operate in conjunction with this 
education for liberty in developing children’s private moralities. 
Against this background, civic education =s curriculum aims, 
first, to enable children to learn about the current state of the 
overlapping consensus—the civic principles of their society and 
how they derive from widely held intuitions about the relationship 
and obligations among citizens. Second, such curriculum must 
enable children to learn about the meaning and consequences of 
those principles—how they have been interpreted in the society, the 
institutions and social practices in which they are instantiated, and 
the outcomes of those laws and practices, both intended and 
otherwise.  
Third, the curriculum must enable children to reflect on the 
relationship between, on the one hand, those principles and their 
consequences and , on the other, the overlapping consensus and 
their developing private moralities. If the curriculum succeeds in 
achieving these aims of helping children to understand the origin,  
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meaning , consequences, and personal implications of the society’s 
civic principles, children should emerge from the public school 
system with the ability to take part as adult citizens in the evolution 
of the overlapping consensus by means of a process of reflective 
equilibrium. However, not only must citizens have this ability, but 
they also must be inclined to make use of it. Finally, then an  
adequate civic education curriculum must, in addition, enable 
children to see and appreciate the public purpose and personal 
meaning of what after all is an intellectually and  morally 
demanding set of activities.  
Many particular configurations of curricular content can 
enable public schools to achieve these aims of civic education, and 
the content appropriate to them may vary from one locality to the 
other, depending on the diverse initial socialization and 
circumstances of children. In other words, one cannot deduce a 
specific content or structure of the curriculum from these general 
philosophical considerations; they provide only a framework for 
constructing and evaluating particular proposals for the curriculum. 
Moreover, much of the school curriculum that has not traditionally 
been understood as part of civic education makes an indirect 
contribution to accomplishing these aims. Language instruction and 
logical training, for example, provide children with skills that 
facilitate the requisite learning. This section will, therefore, analyze 
only some general aspects of the school curriculum that are relevant 
to the specifically civic content appropriate to achieving these aims.  
I have argued elsewhere (Bull, in press) that teaching children 
to understand and appreciate other cultures in their nation is an 
important element in education for personal liberty in that it enables 
children to consider for themselves conceptions of the good as 
alternatives to those available in their families and immediate 
communities. Therefore, it expands their freedom to become their 
own persons rather than persons determined entirely by their 
immediate social environment. Such teaching simultaneously 
strengthens the entire system of personal liberty by helping children 
to appreciate others’ cultures as real possibilities for their own 
lives, not just as alien curiosities to be benevolently or perhaps 
grudgingly tolerated. In addition, teaching about cultures also 
makes an important contribution to civic education for an 
overlapping consensus but for reasons at odds with those most 
frequently cited in the civic education literature, namely, to 
facilitate democratic deliberation by helping children to understand, 
anticipate, and negotiate the disagreements that they are likely to 
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encounter in democratic societies (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). 
Learning about other cultures in their society can also enable 
children to understand the commonalities as well as the divergences 
in belief among the members of those cultures. In this way, such 
teaching can provide children with a knowledge of the current 
overlapping consensus about political principles and of the shared 
moral intuitions from which it derives. Thus, the content of an 
adequate civic education emphasizes whatever unity of belief that 
may exist across cultural differences rather than the differences 
themselves. Combined with instruction that emphasizes our 
diversity in order to foster and strengthen personal liberty, the 
content of the school curriculum, therefore, provides a rebuts 
conception of multiculturalism in the society, a conception that 
expresses both what unifies the nation’s citizens and what divides 
them.  
Undoubtedly it is inherently valuable for children to learn 
about their own and other nations’ histories, but the content of 
history also has a special relevance to civic education for an 
overlapping consensus. For it presents the opportunity to consider 
at a remove in time and place the relationship between nations’ 
cultures, their civic ideals, and the results of the policies adopted to 
achieve those ideals. Especially when the nations under study are 
liberal societies adapted, history can reveal the tensions among 
those three factors the way in which the societies adapted their 
ideals and policies in light of those tensions. And when the nation 
under study is one’s own, history reveals to children the mutable 
nature of the overlapping consensus and the reasons in the national 
experience for the changes that have taken place in the nation’s 
civic aspirations and ideals. These lessons are crucial for children’s 
gaining an accurate understanding of the nature of an overlapping 
consensus and for providing them with an appropriate perspective 
on the tentative status and justifiability of one’s own nation’s 
current political principles and policies. Without such a perspective, 
children might come to regard their nation’s commitments to be 
either absolute or entirely culturally relative, neither of which 
would prepare them to take part seriously in the continuous 
reconstitution of the overlapping consensus. It is clear that learning 
about the changes that have taken place in a nation’s civic ideals 
and their policy interpretations is an important corrective to the 
assumption that they are infallible. But also learning that those 
changes can be seen as rational, if sometimes mistaken, responses 
to experience also corrects the assumption that those ideals and 
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policies are nothing but an expression of the majority=s untutored 
cultural preferences. Either of these assumptions actively 
discourages children from taking the formulation of a nation’s 
overlapping consensus seriously, for on the first there is seemingly 
no need to do so, and on the second there is no point in expending 
one’s energy on a matter that is immune from conscious influence. 
As one possible example, the history curriculum in American 
schools might consider the social, economic, and religious 
controversies involved in the debate over slavery prior to and 
during the U.S. Civil war and the evolving public policies and 
policy proposals to which they led. Such a study of the evolving 
overlapping consensus during this time, the changing public 
policies in which it was instantiated, the social and economic 
consequences of those policies, and the various private and public 
reactions to those consequences can illustrate to children both the 
tentative nature of civic ideals and patterns of reasoning employed 
by citizens at the time to reconcile their private moralities, 
aspirations, and experiences with those of their fellow citizens.  
Admittedly, this curriculum involves a particularly 
intellectualized view of history, for it entails the perspective that 
human reason and understanding play a significant role in the 
shaping of national ideas and the events that flow from them. And 
for that reason, it will not be easy for children to master. 
Nonetheless, it reveals just how profoundly intellectual the task of 
civic education for an overlapping consensus is.  
This intellectual quality of the curriculum is equally on 
display in another crucial and related aspect of its content. For an 
overlapping consensus is the reasonable confluence of popular 
belief about abstract principles of government and the obligations 
of citizenship, not merely shared opinions or intuition about what 
should be done in particular circumstances. For children to view the 
rights and duties of citizens as resulting from such principles, the 
civic education curriculum must also include a philosophical 
element, in its widest sense. The purpose of this element is to 
enable children to view their and others’ action as instance of the 
application of, to use Immanuel Kant’s phrase, maxims of action 
(Kant, 1785/1985). Seeing one’s actions as following such general 
rules involves and develops children’s capacity to abstract from 
particular actions and to see patterns in them. It may also be one of 
humans’ fundamental logical and moral capacities. Of course, in 
developing this capacity, one must avoid enforcing Kant’s 
metaphysical doctrines about such maxims—such as, that the only 
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genuinely moral maxims are universal and unconditional—because 
public education is not to indoctrinate children to accept 
controversial metaphysical positions. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
teach children this way of viewing human actions without any 
particular metaphysical accompaniment. In doing so, one enables 
children to analyze the actions of government and their citizens as 
following from general principles, which they can then formulate, 
reflect on , and perhaps criticize, reinterpret, or reformulate on the 
basis of their and other’s experience and their own private 
moralities. Indeed, these philosophical abilities can be developed in 
part in the context of the history curriculum as it has been 
conceived above. Children can be invited and encouraged to 
conceptualize, for example, the principles of government and their 
rationales that may have emerged from the commitments and 
circumstances of various social group during the Civil War era. 
These abilities are crucial to children=s eventual participation in the 
process of reflective equilibrium as I, following Rawls, have 
conceived it, for they make it possible to see actions, practices, and 
policies as serving principles. 
This characterization of the content of the civic education 
curriculum as involving multicultural, historical, and philosophical 
elements is, no doubt, incomplete. But it demonstrates the kind of 
analysis necessary for formulating such a curriculum. However, 
there is one central elements of civic education to which the content 
I have outlined does not necessarily speak, namely, children’s 
motivation to involve themselves in the reflective process through 
which the overlapping consensus emerges. This aim, I believe, is 
less a matter of curricular content than of the instructional 
procedures through which that content is presented and learned.  
Perhaps the key to such motivation is to enable children to 
explore the connection between the formulation of and adherence to 
civic principles, on the one hand, and their emerging private 
moralities, on the other. By this, I do not mean what consequences 
the principles have for the selfish interest of children, for private 
moralities, which are usually based in culture, are not inherently or 
even usually self-directed. Rather, what I do mean is what 
consequences these principles have for children’s own self-defined 
interests, which are not necessarily interests in themselves. Nor do I 
mean that such an exploration should focus only on the teleological 
outcomes of the principles, for children’s emegin moralities can 
have deontological as well as teleological components. In short, this 
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exploration involves the connection between the civic principles 
and what children are coming to believe is right and good.  
To accomplish this exploration, it seems necessary to 
encourage children to assess from their own perspectives the 
principles that they are discovering in the overlapping consensus. In 
other words, the teaching about cultures, history, and principles 
must at some point make room for and facilitate children’s reaching 
their own judgments about the nature and justification of the 
overlapping consensus. In part this means that children must be 
encouraged to be active and independent in the search for the civic 
meaning of current governmental and social policies and practices. 
That is, they must be encouraged to formulate hypotheses about 
such matters, but they must also be encourage to take seriously the 
hypotheses of others, including adults and other children. For what 
they are ultimately seeking is not their own private interpretations 
but an understanding of civic principles that can stand up to public 
security. But equally important, they must be encouraged to 
formulate their own judgments about the adequacy of these 
principles, judgments based in part on what is publicly known 
about the principles’ consequences but also on what their emerging 
private moralities make of those consequences. What emerges from 
these observation is a portrait of a civic education classroom in 
which children are mutually engaged in the search for the 
formulation and meaning of their civic ideals and that is respectful 
of the judgments that children from about them.  
 
   III. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis suggests that Rawls’s conceptions of an overlapping 
and of the process of reflective equilibrium from which that 
consensus emerges offer a solution to the problems of civic 
education with which this essay began. The aims, content, and 
instructional procedures of a civic education for an overlapping 
consensus do not require teachers to provide instruction in a 
metaphysical theory of public morality. While such an education 
takes note of what citizens happen to believe about the nature and 
significance of their civic ideals, it does not leave children without 
the capability of reaching moral judgments about those ideals. 
Moreover, the judgments that children reach are not simply the 
application of an established and official civic doctrine but are the 
result of a thoughtful analysis of the public meaning of civic 
principles and of an assessment of those principles= capability of 
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meeting the requirements of children’s emerging private moralities. 
And because of that analysis and assessment, children have self-and 
public-referential reasons to engage honestly and actively with their 
society’s civic ideals, to take seriously the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship.  
On this account, then, civic education contributes simultaneously 
to the construction of the self and to the construction of one’s society, 
and it does so interactively, so that the emerging self is neither simply a 
matter of internalizing norms that are supplied from without, as a civic 
religion might imply, nor simply a matter of applying one’s own 
conception of the good to the principles, policies, and institutions of 
society, as ones’ private morality might bid one to do. In this way, civic 
education can be a complex kind of moral education in which students 
learn from and teach themselves and other. And contrary to the claims of 
deliberative democrats (Gutmann,1999) and communitarians (Bellah et 
all., 1991) the political liberalism that Rawls envisions makes possible 
an attractive if demanding civic education that is much more public than 
they believe possible in a liberal society. Rather than an irresistibly 
privatizing civic morality, Rawls’s brand of liberalism implies, as we 
have seen, an education for involvement in public dialogue about civic 
values that nevertheless does not require that the demands of private 
morality are ignored or eclipsed entirely.  
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